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Since the mid-1990s, Russia has been gradually liberalizing its regulation on the transfers of subsoil use rights. The original version of the Federal Law “On Subsoil,” adopted in 1992 (the “Subsoil Law”), was silent on the matter, and therefore subsoil use rights were originally not transferable. Currently, the Subsoil Law provides for a number of cases when subsoil use rights are, or can be, transferred from a subsoil user to another person or entity and the underlying subsoil use license reissued in the name of the transferee without the need to undergo the complex and risky procedure of applying for a new license through a tender or auction. Such cases generally include corporate reorganizations, acquisitions of business in the course of bankruptcy proceedings, and transfers of subsoil use rights to related companies.

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17 Total Interested in Gazprom’s Giant Onshore Field
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Gazprom is planning to involve Total (France) in development of the gigantic Astrakhanskoye gas condensate deposit. The companies discussed the possible French participation at a recent meeting in Paris between the heads of the two companies. Estimates of deposit reserves are 4.2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and almost 830 million tons of gas condensate. Annual production could reach 50-60 billion cubic meters, but the deposit now produces only 12 billion cubic meters because of environmental restrictions and the need for expensive technologies. Gazprom expects that Total, in addition to financial participation, would introduce the newest technologies, especially regarding gas processing.

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Russian governmental attempts to stimulate development of Eastern Russia via the construction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline and the granting of tax privileges are beginning to yield results. Combined with the rise in oil prices, the economic prospects for East Siberian oil projects have improved. Nonetheless, forecasting remains difficult. The Verkhnechonskoye project, as estimated by experts at TomskNIPIneft, reflects the economic risks facing regional deposit development projects. As a result, a new approach has emerged for evaluating prospects at both Verkhnechonskoye and other similar projects in the region.

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Pipeline monopoly Transneft has applied to the Ministry of Industry and Energy for an extension in the construction terms for the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) from the end of 2008 to the end 2009. Because of the project delay, Transneft will need additional construction funds, given the rise in inflation, as well as increases in metal prices, construction work and equipment. As
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Ukraine has two alternative regimes for the use of subsoil: the Licensing Regime and the production sharing agreements regime (the “PSA Regime”). This article is devoted exclusively to the Licensing Regime, including its legislative and practical aspects in 2007 and the prospects for its development in 2008, with special emphasis on its applicability to foreign investors in the oil and gas sector.

There are serious and on-going flaws in the legislative basis for the Licensing Regime, as well as in its practical application. Despite these flaws, the Licensing Regime exists and has been used by domestic and international companies in Ukraine with various degrees of success. A positive aspect for foreign investors is that Ukraine participates in the Energy Charter and ICSID, as well as bilateral investment protection and tax treaties, which considerably strengthen the protection mechanisms available to them when investing in Ukraine under the Licensing Regime.

Legal Basis for the Licensing Regime

The Licensing Regime is regulated by subsoil legislation, which includes the 1994 Subsoil Code (the “Subsoil Code”) and the 2001 Law “On Oil and Gas” (the “Oil & Gas Law”) (we omit the laws regulating other types of subsoil resources) and is spelled out in various subsequent regulations. Therefore, a standard laws-based legislative basis, albeit outdated and at times ambiguous and conflicting, does exist for the Licensing Regime (hereinafter - the “Standard Legislative Basis”).

Since 2004, however, the Parliament of Ukraine (the “Rada”) has suspended the Standard Legislative Basis through annually adopted Laws on the State Budget (the “Budget Laws”), and stipulated an annual ad hoc system for the Licensing Regime based not on laws, but on regulations adopted annually by the Government (the Cabinet of Ministers) of Ukraine (the “GOU”). The 2004 suspension initially seemed to be only a temporary, emergency measure based on just a few lines in the Budget Law, which had no basis in the subsoil legislation. However, over the years, this temporary measure has in practice evolved into a new system of its own. In sum, the Standard Legislative Basis for the Licensing Regime is being replaced annually by the ad hoc regulation-based system (the “Regulation-Based System”).

In practice, this replacement happens through a two-step process: (1) the Standard Legislative Basis is suspended, usually at the end of the year, by the Budget Law for the next year; and then (2) in the first quarter of the next year, usually by mid-March, the GOU adopts licensing regulations for that particular year, which remain in effect only through the end of that year (also resulting in the fact that there is no legal basis at all for issuing licenses during the gap period running from 1 January of the year in question until the time when the GOU adopts new regulations, sometimes not until March or even April). This ad hoc Regulation-Based System, of course, creates a high degree of unpredictability and instability and makes the oil and gas sector much more prone to political influence and dependent on the composition, orientation and discretion of the GOU of the moment.

Unfortunately, for 2008 we do not see the much-needed return to the Standard Legislative Basis as likely because the Budget Law for 2008 again provides for the suspension of the Standard Legislative Basis and renews the flawed Regulation-Based System.

The Licensing Regime is regulatory rather than contractual because, under it, an investor applies to the State for a permit (license) to use subsoil (“Subsoil Permit”). A state body authorized to issue Subsoil Permits (the Licensing Body”) issues a Subsoil Permit. Over the years, the Licensing Body has changed several times, and the current Licensing Body is Ukraine’s Ministry for Protection of the Natural Environment (the “Environmental Protection Ministry”). It should be noted that Subsoil Permits are issued separately for exploration (an “Exploration Subsoil Permit”) and for production (a “Production Subsoil Permit”). Issuance of the Subsoil Permit must be accompanied by an agreement between the Licensing Body and the
subsoil user on the conditions for using subsoil (a “Licensing Agreement”), which is considered to be an integral part of the relevant Subsoil Permit. There is no model Licensing Agreement and, in practice, Licensing Agreements vary in their contents, depending on which particular Subsoil Permit they are attached to (for example, the Oil & Gas Law has a list of key terms and conditions for a Licensing Agreement) and many other factors.

Under the Regulation-Based System, Subsoil Permits are generally sold through auctions (“Auction Procedure”). In certain special cases, determined by the GOU, Subsoil Permits are instead granted without holding an auction (“Non-Auction Procedure”).

It is important to note that in addition to a Subsoil Permit, which is obtained for the use of a specific subsoil area pursuant to the subsoil legislation, there is also a requirement to obtain a license allowing a company generally to carry out a certain type of activity, such as exploration or production. The licensing of types of activity in various industries is regulated by the Law “On Licensing Certain Types of Economic Activity.”

Key Features of the Licensing Regime in 2007 and Trends for 2008

We have identified the following notable changes to the Regulation-Based System for 2007 as compared to 2006, which we categorize as (1) positive, (2) general or (3) negative.

(1) Positive Tendencies
It appears that, in 2007, the following three positive tendencies of high importance to foreign investors were introduced (although there is no guarantee that they will continue in 2008):

— The respective GOU regulations established clearer (but still not sufficient-
In particular, well-connected companies have received a surprisingly large share of the Subsoil Permits on offer (including in the oil and gas sector). In reality, auctions for Subsoil Permits have often been used as a cover, and only the least attractive and most expensive oil and gas areas were allowed to be auctioned. Subsoil Permits for the rest of the areas have been granted through “exceptions” to the Auction Procedure. Unsurprisingly, even those few auctions that did take place in 2007 in the oil and gas sector either did not attract any bidders, failed to sell any Subsoil Permits, or sold very few Exploration Subsoil Permits, and no Production Subsoil Permits were offered at all. The analysis of the Auction Procedure in 2007 shows that it is not sufficiently transparent and allows for baseless cancellation of an auction or withdrawal of some Subsoil Permits from the auction. In addition to the regulatory flaws, the practical implementation of the Auction Procedure in 2006-2007 was inconsistent, ambiguous, and deeply flawed. This resulted in highly publicized scandals, which caused the President of Ukraine to issue a Decree in the fall of 2007, suspending all future auctions.

In practice, some well-connected local companies often obtain Exploration Subsoil Permits, but rather than investing in exploration, proceed immediately to commercial production (periodically extending the terms of their Exploration Subsoil Permits), using a loophole in the law that allows “test” production in the course of exploration. Therefore, some holders of Exploration Subsoil Permits are actually not interested in attracting foreign investors or obtaining Production Subsoil Permits because they are already actively involved in “gray” commercial production.

Another negative tendency was that, in 2007, the GOU declared unlawful the traditional method by which foreign investors participate in the use of subsoil, namely, through joint activity agreements with Ukrainian holders of Subsoil Permits (“JAAs”). In general, JAAs are possible under Ukrainian civil legislation, and in particular, the Oil & Gas Law recognizes the tie between JAAs and oil & gas exploration and production by mentioning it in various contexts.

At the outset, it should be noted that JAAs do not represent a sufficiently solid and risk-free legal basis for long-term investment in the oil and gas sector. First, there are a number of legal concerns in the general civil law and the tax regime applicable to JAAs. Second, JAAs specifically in the oil and gas sector do not allow foreign investors to acquire any rights to Subsoil Permits held by local partners in the JAAs. The law does not permit a JAA to wholly or partially reformulate (transfer) a Subsoil Permit. In practice, the Licensing Body usually handwrote on a Subsoil Permit—previously issued to the local partner of a JAA—that the deposit was being developed with the assistance of a certain foreign investor on the basis of a JAA. However, such handwritten notes had no basis in the law, and did not protect foreign investors when conflicts arose with the local partner that held the Subsoil Permit or with State authorities. Because the Subsoil Permit was issued in the local partner’s name only, the foreign investor’s stake in the Subsoil Permit was indirect and based exclusively on its civil-law agreement (JAA) with the local partner.

In practice, the Licensing Body (in all its various reincarnations, including the present Environmental Protection Ministry) had always recognized JAAs, and even encouraged foreign investors to invest in oil and gas projects specifically through JAAs. Another Ministry responsible for the oil and gas sector, the Ministry for Fuel and Energy, seemed to consider JAAs as being almost the only option available to attract foreign investors into the oil-and-gas sector. Meanwhile, the GOU was well aware of this practice and, never raising any objection, silently accepted it.

However, in 2007, the GOU adopted an inconsistent and contradictory approach towards JAAs. The Environmental Protection Ministry continued to recognize and promote JAAs and Mr. Boiko, the Minister for Fuel and Energy, traveled the world and called for international oil & gas companies to invest in Ukraine. Both knew full well that JAAs are realistically the only option actually being offered to foreign investors. The GOU, however, took a new course in 2007 of undermining their legitimacy in the oil and gas sector. Following the GOU’s instructions, the State Tax Administration, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance and the same Ministry for Fuel and Energy came to the unanimous—but unexpected—conclusion that the GOU considers the use of JAAs to invest in oil and gas exploration and production to be unlawful. Meanwhile, despite the GOU’s new position, the Ministry for Fuel and Energy’s press service continues to welcome investment in oil and gas sector, declaring in the Uriadovy Courier newspaper dated June 12, 2007 that Ukraine “is open for such investments” and “can guarantee openness for business, protection of investments based on rules of law and an independent court system and the Government’s political support ...” Obviously, the GOU’s inconsistent, hostile and hypocritical position with regard to JAAs creates substantial risks for foreign investment in the oil and gas sector, while raising doubts about the GOU’s true intentions.

Finally, another major negative setback in 2007 has been the GOU’s open interference in the gas market. The Budget Law for 2007 and the later GOU Resolution No. 31 dated January 16, 2007 introduced restrictions on the sale of natural gas extracted by Ukrainian companies. Those in which the state owns a majority stake are now required to sell their natural gas exclusively to NJSC Naftogaz Ukrainy at a price approved by the National Commission for Regulation of the Electric Power Industry (NCRE), i.e. at low pric-
es set by the state. It is important to note that these restrictions apply not only to gas owned by companies in which the state owns a majority stake, but also to gas owned by their privately-owned JAA or JV partners. For example, if a foreign investor happened to have a JAA or JV with such a state-controlled company, the share of extracted gas belonging to this foreign investor would also be subject to these restrictions, and the foreign investor would be forced to sell its share of gas to NJSC Naftogaz Ukrainy at an artificially low, regulated price.

Because of the above restrictions, 2007 saw gas prices in Ukraine set not by the free market, but by the state. Predictably, these restrictions outraged the investment community and resulted in litigation - while the GOU openly ignored the protests and court decisions.

Ironically, at the same time the Ministry of Fuel and Energy has opined that, in order to make production profitable, oil and gas companies need to gradually increase the price they charge for natural gas until it becomes profitable to produce. Most unfortunately, the Budget Law for 2008 contains the same restrictions, so we expect that in 2008, this issue will again wind up in the courts.

Separate Procedure for Non-Residents

Article 68 of the Subsoil Code stipulates a different procedure for authorizing foreign legal entities and individuals (“Non-Residents”) to use subsoil: the Separate Procedure for Non-Residents, which is set forth in more detail in a 1998 GOU Resolution (“Resolution 841”) and is tender-based, with the tender’s winner subsequently entering into a contract with the GOU. The Separate Procedure has not been used in practice, but is treated by the GOU as being valid, and therefore can theoretically be applied to non-residents at any time, because it has never been suspended either on the legislative or on the regulatory levels. Although the idea of reviving the Separate Procedure for Non-Residents may seem far-fetched, if in fact the new GOU has the political will to attract foreign investors, the Separate Procedure could be its best tool for bypassing the restrictions prescribed by laws without needing first to ask the Rada to change the laws. We believe that the Separate Procedure presents foreign investors with an intriguing opportunity and a sound legal basis for obtaining Subsoil Permits outside of the current flawed Auction or Non-Auction Procedures, and for basing relationships with the GOU on a contract protected by stronger international mechanisms.

GOU Plans for the Development of the Oil and Gas Sector

In 2007, the GOU and the President of Ukraine made a number of declarations about developing the energy sector, improving its legal basis and attracting foreign investment in this sector, in particular:

(1) The GOU approved a plan to reform and develop the energy sector, which includes: (a) drafting (in 2007-2008) a law “On the Basics of Natural Gas Market Operation” (relevant instructions were given to the Ministry for Fuel and Energy and Naftogaz); (b) drafting (in 2007-2008) regulations on production sharing with the purpose of increasing natural gas production; and (c) bringing natural gas prices to a level that would cover costs and secure accumulation of capital sufficient to fund further investment in the infrastructure of fuel and energy companies (expected to take place in 2009-2012).

(2) In a decision dated June 15, 2007, the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council (“UNSDC”) recommended that the President of Ukraine add the following provisions to the principal guidelines of the State’s Policy of Ensuring Ukraine’s Energy Security, approved by the Ukrainian President’s Edict No. 1863 dated December 27, 2005: “creation of stable, predictable and transparent conditions for investment in the fuel and energy industry by improving the legislation without prejudice to international standards.” Also, according to the UNSDC decision, the GOU was instructed to approve and implement, by the end of 2007, measures to improve the procedure for attracting investment in the exploration and production of Ukrainian hydrocarbons, in particular hard-to-extract and depleted reserves.

(3) By his Decree No. 842, dated September 7, 2007, the President of Ukraine approved a plan for stabilizing the natural gas market and instructed the GOU to draft a law whereby investors would be involved in oil and gas projects through tenders.

Unfortunately, to date, these good intentions have not been implemented. In practice, in 2007, the GOU continued to carry out hostile policies against investors and cultivated an unpredictable, contradictory and arbitrary regime for investment in the energy sector. It remains to be seen whether the new Rada and the new GOU will introduce serious positive changes in the energy sector and the good intentions will be implemented in practice.

RULG-Ukrainian Legal Group is a full-service law firm based in Kiev and Washington, D.C. that provides comprehensive legal support to large- and medium-sized international corporate clients doing business in Ukraine and other CIS countries. One of the RULG’s key practice areas is upstream oil & gas, both under licensing regime and under the PSA regime. RULG authored the production sharing legislation (two laws and a number of regulations) for Ukraine, which provided the legislative basis for the first ever Ukrainian PSA signed in October 2007. Detailed information about RULG practice is available at www.rulg.com. Dr. Paliashvili can be contacted at irinap@rulg.com.